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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the incentives and 
constraints that a typical bureaucrat face in his or her daily activity and to 
present some conclusions related to the most likely behavior of 
bureaucrats. We begin by analyzing the behavior toward advantage 
seeking. We then apply the hypothesis of rent-seeking behavior to the 
activity of bureaucrats. After discussing the main differences between the 
incentives and constraints of the managers of privately owned enterprises 
and bureaucrats, we conclude that the activity of rent-seeking 
characterizes the activity of bureaucrats. Finally, we identify the rule of law 
as the best institutional arrangement for discouraging the rent-seeking 
activity of bureaucrats. 
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Rent and rent-seeking 
Economic rent is defined as the surplus that a factor of production gets above 
the minimum amount of money needed to keep it in its current. All factors of 
production have alternative uses in which they can earn more or less than in their 
current use. The opportunity cost of using one factor of production is the best 
alternative use that must be forgone. In order to prevent it from moving from one use to 
another, a factor of production must earn a sufficient amount of money (i.e. by 
definition the economic rent). 
Capital, land, and labor have all alternative uses. Their owners will seek the 
most productive use for their property. For instance, a parcel of land can be used for 
agriculture or it can serve for developing a residential area. The owner of the parcel 
must earn enough from cultivating the land in order to prevent him from transferring its 
use for buildings. In other words, the owner must earn enough in economic rent. 
The owners of labor-power can also earn economic rent. If an engineer can earn 
in the current employment a salary that is greater than the one in the best available 
alternative, he or she earns an economic rent. The analysis of the economic rent earned 
by the owners of labor-power is complicated by the non-monetary advantages that 
people obtain from different jobs, advantages that influence their decisions. The size of 
the economic rent obtained by the mentioned engineer can be substantially different in 
the actual use of his or her work-power. In other words, the economic rent for the  
  82 
Revista Tinerilor Economişti (The Young Economists Journal) 
 
owners of labor-power is given by the sum of monetary and non-monetary gains in the 
actual use over the gains in the best available alternative. 
Seeking and keeping the economic rent define the behavior of the people as 
resource owners. Economic rent is a very pleasant thing for the individual that gains it. 
However, it is under a permanent threat from the competition. To describe the behavior 
aimed at obtaining and keeping economic rent, economists use the term rent-seeking. 
Resource owners will engage in rent-seeking and rent-keeping activities when they 
believe that the anticipated benefits are greater than the anticipated costs. For example, 
employees that realize that in the current occupation gain economic rent will resort to 
strikes or some other means of pressure if they are at risk of losing their jobs. In terms 
of rent-seeking behavior, we can define a strike as the most powerful means that 
employees can use in order to keep the economic rent they gain in the current 
employment. 
Capital owners can also gain economic rent. The competition makes market 
prices to be closely related to the opportunity cost. This way, the economic rent is 
diminished. It can be regained through finding new ways to satisfy the consumers, 
technological improvements, and better management. To the degree that the consumers 
are willing to pay a price that covers the opportunity cost, wealth is created. People’s 
behavior aimed at gaining rent through creating benefit is called profit-seeking. For an 
entrepreneur, the rent the plane through political means is just as good as their end of 
day and through markets. In addition, it has a net advantage: the government can 
protect the rent through obstructing the competition. 
Let us take the case of an automobile manufacturer. Studying the incentives and 
constraints that the managers face in their rent-seeking behavior can help us create a 
proper image. The enterprise gains profits that stock owners and managers think as 
appropriate. However, profits are declining due to increased competition from foreign 
producers. If the enterprise does not adapt its production to the consumers’ demand, 
profits will continue to decrease and will ultimately turn to losses. If the rules of the 
game in the economy allow it, the managers have a strong incentive to seek protection 
from the politicians through some form of entering barriers (for example, through the 
introduction of import duties). Since the economic case in favor of free international 
trade is strong, economists explain import duties based on the rent-seeking behavior: 
some producers are successful in convincing politicians that sector X of the economy 
needs protection from foreign competition. 
The structure of incentives and constraints (i.e. the rules of the game) is the 
main element that models the behavior of entrepreneurs in their trying to engage in 
rent-seeking as opposed to profit-seeking. Therefore, there are two opposite ways of 
action for a resource owner seeking the most profitable productive destination for his 
resources: rent-seeking and profit-seeking. The difference between the two is given by 
the wealth that is created in the economy. The entrepreneurial way of obtaining and 
keeping the rent is the one that produces wealth in the economy (Cowen & Tabarrok, 
1999). The political way does not produce wealth; it merely transfers the benefits from 
one person to another. 
The rent-seeking bureaucrat  
Without any doubt, the term bureaucrat has a pejorative meaning. No one 
thinks that his or her job is related to bureaucracy. In the eyes of the public, the 
bureaucrat is thought to be indolent, indifferent, without initiative, and always ready to 
take bribes. Nevertheless, we will employ the following hypothesis: the bureaucrat is no  
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different then the business people or managers. One does not need special 
characteristics in order to become a public servant. In fact, there are numerous cases in 
which politicians employ trustworthy managers to run a government bureau. The 
bureaucrats are no better or worse than their equivalent working for private 
corporations. The bureaucrats are employed by the government administration or by 
various regulation agencies. The official denomination of such employees is public 
servants, but in economic theory, bureaucrats and bureaucracy are the common terms 
used. Analyzing the set of incentives and constraints of bureaucrats is essential in 
determining their behavior. The bureaucrats have a strong incentive to serve the 
interests of the politicians that supervise their bureau. 
There is a fundamental distinction between private company and a government 
bureau: unlike the private company, a government bureau does not seek profits. The 
purpose of the bureau is to supply a good or service in exchange for a budget that the 
state periodically grants it. The consumers do not buy the goods or services that the 
bureau supplies in the regular sense, so the value that consumers assign to those goods 
and services cannot be determined. That does not mean that the goods or services are of 
no value. It simply means that the value of the good or service cannot be identified. 
Some bureaus may charge consumers a user fee in exchange for the service supplied, 
but usually this does not cover the costs incurred. 
In the case of bureaus, since there is no profit drive, efficiency is a futile term. 
The efficiency of privately owned firms is the result of voluntary actions of individuals. 
The activity of government bureaus is based on state financing, i.e. it obtains its 
revenue through coercive means. However, efficiency cannot exist in lack of voluntary 
behavior. The outcome is that there is no precise tool to be used to assess the degree to 
which a bureau reaches its targets. A bureau cannot be assessed as being more efficient 
than other that supplies the same service in a different area. Accordingly, bureaucrats 
cannot be rewarded with higher payments for their success nor can they be punished for 
failure. 
Given the fundamental distinction between the incentives of bureaucrats and 
managers, one may ask the following question: what are the goals of a bureaucrat? The 
answer given in the last century by Public Choice school theoreticians is that the 
fundamental goal of a bureaucrat is to try to maximize the budget of his organization. A 
high budget is advantageous to the bureau chief and to the lower level bureaucrats. The 
goals that the bureau chief may have can always be better attained with a higher budget, 
caeteris paribus. Among the goals of the bureau chief, we can enumerate reputation, 
transfer to a larger or better bureau or other government position in the future, getting a 
good job in the private sector, and being elected to a political office. Lower-level 
bureaucrats also favor a large budget. A large budget means an increase of personnel. 
Consequently, the demand for supervisors is likely to increase. The chances for 
promotion are higher in a large organization. A large budget could also mean a better 
working environment for lower level bureaucrats. They may have more machines, a 
larger office, and a more modern equipment to work with. Lower level bureaucrats are 
thus likely to favor a bureau chief that promises to augment the size of the bureau. 
As shown above, the bureaucrat is a rent-seeker. They tend to gain advantages 
in the current occupation that is higher than the best available alternative; they will 
spend resources to preserve that gain. The existing literature on this subject points that 
they can influence the political decision-making process to their own benefit.  
The rule of law as a set of constraints in the public sector  
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The political way of seeking competition advantages (i.e. rent-seeking) does 
not produce new benefit for the economy; it merely redistributes the value that has 
already been created. Since in many cases it takes the shape of restrictions imposed to 
the free competition, rent-seeking behavior leads to market distortions. These 
distortions, especially when they influence the exchange rate and the price of various 
goods and services, lead to increased difficulties for individuals to plan for the unsure 
future and increase chances for error (Ikeda, 2003). The prospect of obtaining economic 
rent through political means modifies the incentives and constraints that people face. 
An increasing number of people will engage in rent-seeking, reorienting scarce 
resources from market competition and consumers’ satisfaction to seeking advantages 
from politicians in their capacity of rules makers. Over time, this activity will 
undermine the trust in law and private property. 
Hence, rent-seeking activity leads to wasting scarce resources.  The institutions 
of an economy are essential in determining the size of rent that is possible to extract 
through political means. As a rule, the greater the benefits over costs, the greater the 
incentive to engaging in rent-seeking. Conversely, the lesser the benefits, the lesser the 
incentive for rent-seeking. Enforcing private property rights and, therefore, individuals’ 
economic freedom, as well as a limited government tends to reduce the level of rent-
seeking. The rule of law represents an institutional arrangement that protects private 
property rights and individual liberty. The rule of law protects individuals from 
arbitrary government intervention and therefore constitutes a guarantee for limited 
government and individual freedom. Legal rules that favor some competitors over 
others in specific markets are clear violations of the rule of law by breaching the 
principle of the universality of law. In fact, as Public Choice theories have proven, the 
excessive regulation of the contemporary economies is a consequence of the rent-
seeking activity in a democracy (Gunning, 2003). An economy that is strictly 
characterized by the rule of law is an economy without rent-seeking activity. 
If successful, the rent-seeking activity is a clear breach of the principles of the 
rule of law. Legal regulations that stem from rent-seeking tend to privilege some 
competitors at the expense of others. Self-oriented competitors are interested in 
capturing politically generated rents and they will spend resources in order to be among 
the winners. Rent-seeking and rent-keeping are fundamental motives for interventionist 
economic policy in modern-day democracies. 
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